Constraints On Procreative Wrongness

Global anti-natalists part ways with local ones in two important respects; (i) in contending that the overriding harms of existence bear on all birthed subjects rather than on some or most ones, and (ii) by believing that moral criticisms of procreative acts can be levied at deliberative agents broadly considered, rather than narrowing the pool of censurable agents to their peer group only, and/or to those who are similarly situated to themselves only.

Here my deployment of global vs. local anti-natalism focuses on the divisions captured in (ii), where moral judgment takes center stage. While local anti-natalists understand moral scrutiny of procreative acts to be position-relative in principle, global counterparts take their admonishments to be position-neutral broadly speaking, and perhaps even in principle. Birthing is a blamable act, according to the global group, insofar as the deliberative agent who births does so volitionally / non-coercively / knowingly. For the local group, standards for blameworthiness must undergo a further probing, leading to their thinning, owing to position-derived wrong-making features and other contingencies.

Particularistic Utilitarianism Demystified

My post on the infighting within contrastive utilitarian theories was an attempt to salvage a principled or generalized handle on heterodox modes of utilitarianism. I sided decisively with Average, Negative and Preference antidotes to Total, Positive and Classical orthodoxies. The result was a spirited endorsement of one system; Negative Average Preference Utilitarianism. This would be fine were it not propped up under the guise of Moral Principlism. Given subsequent forays into Moral Particularism, I averred –– albeit far too latently –– that any isolated system of ethics cannot be reconciled with Principlism in good conscience, since the machinery of Principlism is itself worrisome. This naturally extends to NAPU’s compliance to Principlism, meaning aspects of that (otherwise dandy) entry could benefit from modification. As usual, I'd rather just do a new post and not addend old ones.

Indications of tension between NAPU and Principlism/Generalism arise in that very post though, due to my encouraging swift and unapologetic abandonments of NAPU in favor of Classical Negative Average Utilitarianism whenever the moral patient is a non-human animal. If NAPU is abandonable on this score, it follows that CNAU would be as well for the obverse reason. This blog's oft-discussed compartmentalization of human vs. non-human moral patients animated a garish undercurrent of particularism; refusing to hold the Preference side hostage to prescriptive invariability. Having grown fonder of variability in the months that followed, I was pleased to see glimmers of it in the post that's now under refinement. Problem is, the post dealt with the three keystones of internal disputation enclosed by utilitarian ethics, with particularism open-for-business in just one of those [Preference vs. Classical]. This makes it easy for readers to gather that Negative and Average utilitarianisms are unfailingly wiser than Positive and Total utilitarianisms. They aren't. What I should have argued is that they are wiser arguably more often, not in principle, as I intend to show.