Saturday, January 4, 2020

Constraints On Procreative Wrongness




Global anti-natalists part ways with local ones in two important respects; (i) in contending that the overriding harms of existence bear on all birthed subjects rather than on some or most ones, and (ii) by believing that moral criticisms of procreative acts can be levied at deliberative agents broadly considered, rather than narrowing the pool of censurable agents to their peer group only, and/or to those who are similarly situated to themselves only.

Here my deployment of global vs. local anti-natalism focuses on the divisions captured in (ii), where moral judgment takes center stage. While local anti-natalists understand moral scrutiny of procreative acts to be position-relative in principle, global counterparts take their admonishments to be position-neutral broadly speaking, and perhaps even in principle. Birthing is a blamable act, according to the global group, insofar as the deliberative agent who births does so volitionally / non-coercively / knowingly. For the local group, standards for blameworthiness must undergo a further probing, leading to their thinning, owing to position-derived wrong-making features and other contingencies.