Change Against The Machine

Have philosophers developed an adequate taxonomy for interrogating the most mature divides and zigzags on life and existence as bearers of disvalue or value? If you believe that they have, tell me what you think that is. For instance, which descriptor best summarizes your outlook on life? Which descriptor have your mortal enemies adopted? Are these terms prodded by assessments of lives as they are in actuality, or are they licensed to go a step further by assessing matters as they might be, however plausibly or implausibly?

What’s a complete outlook on life anyway? Do speakers owe their audiences a theory of meaning, or are they justified in remaining silent about the arguably hazardous possibility of meaninglessness despite their eagerness to advance a lucid theory of value/disvalue? Would subdividing 'meaning' along cosmic vs. terrestrial lanes make any real difference?

Should armchair-derived outlooks have their own labels, or are they better kept overshadowed by the formal and orderly labels philosophical evaluators have come to depend on?

If you think this terminology can be covered by anti-natalism and natalism, or by anti-mortalism and pro-mortalism, or by the more conventional and general standoffs between pessimism and optimism, I humbly ask that you rethink those picks as you read through this.

Refining Welfarism & Moral Fallibilism

Refining Welfarism & Moral Fallibilism

A Renewed Look At Interests And Judgments

Semi poetic opener:

"Ask not what we can do for goodness, ask what goodness can do for us"

But more contentiously:

"Ask not what victimizers can do for rightness, ask what rightness can do for victims"

Now soak in the reversal:

"Ask not what goodness can do for us, ask what we can do for goodness"

And the corollary:

     "Ask not what rightness can do for victims, ask what victimizers can do for rightness"

The first set of quotes is foundationally suitable. That is to say; when reason-giving and explication bottoms out, the initial set of quotes can be declared superior to the inverted set. The ideal analyzer may declare them as superior even if the only way to get there is by fiat. No doubt, fiat is analytically icky, but rarely is it taken to be an invalidator of virtues like intellectual candor. Do candid types arrive at intellectual honesty through something other than fiat? If so, what exactly? How might we prove to someone that they ought to value intellectual honesty over the competition?

You might think that a truth-seeker proclaiming the superiority of intellectual honesty –– and with it the inferiority of intellectual dishonesty –– is disanalogous to my proclaiming the initial set of quotes as superior to the inverted set. But what makes these proclamations disanalogous? Empiricism? Come now. It can't be that. The call to science is itself a non-empirical endeavour. Denial of this manifests in the circularity of a truth-seeker applying evidence to dissuade someone against their apathy or hostility towards evidence.

When it comes to intellectual honesty, the only real competitor is intellectual dishonesty. Value the former, disvalue the latter. Simple as. The fiat, however icky, is left standing. The verdict stands tall despite its offputtingly unempirical [evaluative] origin. So it is with the above quotes, notably the first set. The only competition in town, after all, is the second set of quotes. The reversals. And they seem rather backwards, for goodness and rightness aren't persons or relational entities that can be harmed/benefitted in the first place. They are communicational tools, they are doxastic tools, and tools of all stripes should not be aggrandised as Something More.